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Abstract: In this paper we analyzed a model of endogenous fertility in presence of financial 
market assets and social security pensions. Given the children externality and in the 
absence of corrective policy, the fertility rate chosen in market economy is too low. 
Indeed, in his optimal choice of family size, the representative household does not take 
into account of this children externality which leads to a sub optimal demography. We 
have shown that an optimal demographic allocation exists and can be implemented 
through a subvention taxation policy if it is available 
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1.Introduction 
n the literature of population growth, two main dominant views of 
reproductive motivations are presented (Dasgupta, 1993). In the first one, 
children are considered as durable consumer goods. In the second one, and 
particularly, in developing countries, children are mainly viewed as investment 
goods, hence the parents reproductive motivation is thus associated to the so-
called old-age security hypothesis (Leibenstein, 1957). According this 
hypothesis (Jellal ,2000; Jellal and Wolff , 2002), in a socio-economic 
environment where parents are unsure about their potential ability to support 
themselves during old age, they may rear children in the expectation of 
receiving support from their children in their old age (Neher, 1971; Willis, 1980; 
Nerlove et al. 1987). The underlying transfer mechanism is one of direct 
reciprocity driven by evolutionary cultural transmission, where parents give first 
and children give later, without any intergenerational conflict , children are 
implicitly considered as passive agents under the control of parents, who honor 
the contract loan by reimbursing their parents during their old-age. This transfer 
mechanism is self enforcing. Indeed, in the literature of the motives underlying 
the inter vivos transfers within the family, Jellal and Wolff (2002) have 
proposed an evolutionary cultural model of filial altruism formation. Moving 
away from the altruism and exchange hypotheses, they study the endogenous 
altruism approach in which private transfers are rooted in a purposeful shaping 
of preferences within the family. The purpose of their paper has been to study 
the motives underlying upstream inter vivos transfers between the generations 
by departing from the traditional approach suggested by Becker (1991) with 
exogenous altruism and the exchange reciprocity hypothesis. Instead, these 
authors have presented a model of endogenous altruism, where private transfers 
are aimed at shaping preferences within the family. Rather than relying on the 
so-called demonstration effect theory, they have presented a  model of cultural 
I 
transmission of filial altruism in which individuals can be of two types, altruistic 
or non altruistic with respect to their parents, and the probability of a child being 
altruistic is positively influenced by the amount of upstream care shown by 
parents. Mainly, they have shown that only the altruistic type of preferences 
survives evolutionary selection, and hence the cultural system converges in the 
long run to a population having kin obligations. Further the authors present an 
empirical analysis of a French tri generational survey which indicates that only 
the predictions of the cultural model of filial altruism are borne out by the data, 
while alternatives approaches (exogenous altruism, exchange) are rejected. In 
particular, helping one’s elders is an effective way to receive services in old age 
from one’s children. Further, the old-age security hypothesis has been strongly 
supported by many empirical studies in developing countries, either in Africa or 
in Asia (Nugent, 1985). For instance, in the case of Malaysia, Raut (1996) has 
shown that the probability that parents will rely on the support of their children 
when they are old is significantly lower for households having high income, 
with better access to private pensions and other financial assets.  Therefore, we 
infer that, when parents consider children as investment goods, the development 
of social security policy or financial market are expected to lower fertility and 
leading to a demographic transition. Indeed, Nugent and Gillaspy (1983) and 
Entwisle and Winegarden (1984) has shown that the demand for children tends 
to decrease with the public pension programs development,  
      
         Hence it seems that the presence of social security tends to substitute 
public for private transfers as a support for old age and thus provided 
motivations to have fewer children. However, having few children per 
household create a large negative externality on the social security pension. 
Indeed, when deciding to choose optimally the optimal size of his family, the 
representative household does not take into account this externality; this fact 
may be harmful for the social security system viability in a decentralized 
economy. 
            
        The main purpose of the present paper is to shed further light about the 
links between le desire of fertility, financial market, private transfers within the 
family and social security. Since social security pension induce a demographic 
externality, we show that the optimal family size is suboptimal. Therefore, in 
order to correct this distortion, we propose a mechanism of taxation which 
restores an optimal demography.  
 
       Our paper is organized as follows : Section 2 presents a simple model , 
Section 3 analyses sub optimal fertility choice under market economy, the 
implementation of optimal centralized fertility allocation is presented in section 
4 and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. The Model 
   We consider a simple two-period model economy. Economic agents maximize 
an inter-temporal utility of their current and future consumption. Young agents 
work, earn labor wage and by filial obligation and cultural transmission, provide 
an exogenous private transfer to their old parent. Following the old-age 
hypothesis, we suppose that the young individuals rear children as investment 
goods. Although their fertility is costly in terms of forgone labor income, when 
they become old, they receive a transfer from their Childs. We suppose that the 
government subsidies their rearing cost by balancing his budget through a flat 
tax.  Further, to be eligible for social security pension, the young agents pay a 
proportional tax on their labor income, which is used by the government to 
finance a public pension system and save on the financial market to smooth their 
consumption profile.  
The representative young agent   maximizes the following inter temporal utility 
function: 
                                                                             (1) 
 
where     and      represent respectively the consumption profile in youth and 
in old age for an individual born at time t and β is the standard discount factor. 
This representative agent maximizes his utility taking into consideration the 
following budget constraints: 
                              
                               
 
Where    is the pension contribution fixed rate paid by all young individuals, 
     is the transfer to the parents, while       denotes the fertility convex 
function cost or the cost of raising   children, which is supposed  subsided at 
fixed rate given by  ,    is saving amount and    is a flat tax collected by the 
government to finance the granted subvention. In their second period of her life, 
the representative agent receives a gross interest factor (      ) on her optimal 
saving. Further, according to the self enforcing old age norm, the agent receives 
also a fixed transfer from each of her child           and a public pension of 
amount     . 
The government budget constraints are presented as follows: 
              
                  
Where      is the ex post optimal average fertility rate in the total population, this 
is this average fertility which represent an intra generation externality. 
 
 
3.  Fertility under Decentralized Market Economy 
   By taking factor prices, and the average number of children as given, the 
individual representative of generation t chooses material consumption over the 
life cycle and fertility to maximize under budget constraints her lifetime utility 
function by solving the following problem: 
                                                                                 (2) 
                               
                                
  Ex post           
 
 The first order conditions for an interior solution for savings and fertility rate 
are given respectively by: 
 
                                                                              (3) 
And 
              
                                                  (4) 
 
 
Of these standard equilibrium conditions we obtain the following first result. 
 
Proposition 1 
The optimal number of children of the representative household is given by: 
                      
       
    
  
 
 
             
 
 
Proof 
It is obtained by substitution from the equations (3) and (4): 
                                                                            
              
                  
                 
      
          
 
Thus            
    
  
 
 
             
  
Since the representative household considers children as investment goods, then 
according to this first theoretical finding, his optimal family size depends 
positively on the return from investing in children, and thus on the private 
transfer    dictated by filial obligation (Jellal and Wolff ,2002), and on the 
growth of wage, but negatively on the return from his optimal saving option. 
Further, since the cost of raising children is subsided, this incentive to procreate 
encourages the representative household to have more children. 
   To conclude, depending on the extent of the taxation subvention scheme, the 
optimal number of children may be too low since the household do not take into 
account the children externality given by the average fertility. The availability of 
an appropriate taxation policy may lead to an optimal demography which 
internalizes the population impact on sustainability of social security pension. 
 
4.  Fertility under Centralized Economy 
    In order to examine the sub optimality of demography in presence of market 
economy, we consider the fertility problem which is implemented by a 
benevolent planner. The main role of later is to recognize the population 
externality impact on the viability of social security system. This recognition 
leads the planner to internalize the positive children externality and choose the 
optimal fertility rate. Indeed, a benevolent planner is supposed to maximize the 
representative agent‘s utility, and thus solves the following program: 
 
                                                                                   (5) 
                                
                                 
                
                   
   Ex ante           
The first order optimal conditions for an interior solution for savings and fertility 
rate are given respectively by: 
 
                                                                              (6) 
And 
         
                                                         (7) 
 
From these optimal equilibrium conditions we obtain the optimal fertility rate 
given by the following result. 
 
Proposition 2 
The planner implements the optimal number of children of the representative 
household which is given by: 
                      
     
   
    
  
 
     
        
 
Proof: 
It is directly obtained by substitution from: 
                             
and  
         
                            . 
 
We observe immediately that the fertility rate choice in a centralized economy 
differs from that chosen in a decentralized economy by the fact that the planner 
takes into account the positive children externality. Therefore, now, the optimal 
number of children depends on the fixed rate of pension contribution given by  . 
Hence, higher is this contribution, higher is number of children. 
 
    Given this first best allocation, we now examine how the government can use 
the available taxation policy to make possible the implementation of centralized 
allocation market economy. 
Proposition 3 
There exists an optimal tax-subvention scheme which leads to a fertility rate 
optimal in market economy and this tax is given by the following rate: 
 
   
 
   
 
  
Proof: 
 
The implemented optimal number   
  of children of the representative 
household which is given by: 
 
     
   
    
  
 
     
        
 
While the number    of children chosen in a market economy is given by:  
 
       
    
  
 
 
             
 
Therefore we have          
     if and only if: 
    
  
 
     
        
  =  
    
  
 
 
             
 
This equality holds if and only if we have:      
 
   
. 
 
 
      We observe that optimal tax subvention rate depends only on the parameters 
of the transfers, those within the family as well as those provided by social 
security pension. Further, the optimal tax depends positively on the social 
security contribution rate and negatively on size of private transfers within the 
family. These results are intuitive.  Then, we showed how we can implement an 
optimal demography size in a market economy if an appropriate taxation 
subvention policy is available and feasible. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
   In this paper we analyzed a simple model of endogenous fertility in presence 
of the availability of financial assets and social security pensions. Given the 
presence of a children externality and in the absence of corrective policy, the 
fertility rate chosen in market economy is too low. Indeed, in his optimal choice 
of family size, the representative household does not take into account of this 
children externality which leads to a sub optimal demography.  We have shown 
that an optimal demographic allocation exists and can be implemented through a 
subvention taxation policy if it is available. 
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